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INTRODUCTION 
On September 25, 2008, President George W. Bush signed into law the 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA).1  When the first President Bush 
signed the original Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) into law in 
1990, he said it was time ―to rejoice in and celebrate another ‗Independence 
Day,‘ one that is long overdue.‖2  For the 43 million Americans with dis-
abilities, the ADA was supposed to represent the opening of doors that had 
long been closed.  Employers, state and local governments, and private 
businesses—from bowling alleys to restaurants—would now be required to 
make reasonable modifications to their facilities, policies, and procedures in 
order to allow full participation by individuals with disabilities.  In short, 
expectations for the ADA were high. 
This probably explains why the ADA is viewed so widely by disability 
rights advocates and its original authors as such a huge disappointment, es-
pecially in the employment context.3  Studies consistently reveal that, de-
spite the ADA, employees who claim to be the victims of disability 
discrimination in the workplace face long odds.4  Plaintiffs outside the 
workplace have enjoyed more success in requiring government actors and 
private businesses to make changes to their existing structures and policies, 
but the reality is that many individuals with disabilities are still excluded 
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  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, available at 
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The biggest limitation of the ADA has been its definition of ―disabili-
ty.‖  In order to be protected by the Act, one must first show the existence 
of a disability.5  To put it mildly, this has not been an easy task.  As origi-
nally drafted, the definition was vague and courts tended to interpret the de-
finition narrowly.  People with a variety of serious physical or mental 
impairments, ranging from AIDS, to cancer, to bipolar disorder, have been 
found not to have disabilities under the ADA.6  In one case, an individual 
with cancer brought suit against his employer and died before the resolution 
of the case, only to be told (posthumously) that his cancer was not limiting 
enough to amount to a disability under the Act.7 
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 sets out to address some of the 
more controversial and problematic aspects of the definition of disability.  
The Act starts with essentially the same basic three-pronged definition of 
disability that existed under the original ADA.  According to the ADAAA: 
The term ―disability‖ means, with respect to an individual— 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more ma-
jor life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment . . . .8 
On closer examination it becomes clear that the Act includes some fair-
ly dramatic changes to the definition.  The following piece summarizes the 
provisions of the new law and offers some tentative predictions as to the ef-
fect of these changes on future cases.  Part I discusses the changes to the 
ADA‘s definition of disability.  Part II describes some of the other impor-
tant changes to the Act.  Finally, Part III identifies some of the issues left 
unresolved by these changes. 
I. CHANGES TO THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
The ADAAA‘s most important revisions involve the definition of disa-
bility.  These revisions include instructions to the courts regarding how the 
terms of the Act should be interpreted; attempted clarification to the Act‘s 
―substantially limits‖ language; expansion of the ―major life activities‖ con-





  42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). 
6
  See, e.g., Blanks v. Sw. Bell Commc‘ns, Inc., 310 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002) (HIV-positive status); 
Ellison v. Software Spectrum, 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996) (breast cancer); Horwitz v. L & J.G. Stickley, 
Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 350 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (bipolar disorder). 
7
  See Hirsch v. National Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977, 980–82 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
8
  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, supra note 1, § 4(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)). 
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A. No More “Demanding Standards” 
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court announced that the terms in 
the ADA‘s definition of disability ―need to be interpreted strictly to create a 
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.‖9  Although the Court drew 
support for this conclusion from the Findings and Purposes that accompa-
nied the Act, the Court‘s interpretive gloss was at odds with the traditional 
approach to interpreting remedial statutes.  One longstanding canon of con-
struction is that remedial statutes should be interpreted broadly.10  Thus, the 
Supreme Court‘s instruction seemed to stand the traditional approach on its 
head. 
The Findings and Purposes section introducing the ADA Amendments 
Act specifically rejects the Court‘s ―demanding standard‖ gloss.  The Act 
also includes a section setting forth rules of construction.11  One rule re-
quires that ―[t]he definition of disability shall be construed in favor of broad 
coverage of individuals under this Act, to the maximum extent permitted by 
the terms of this Act.‖12 
B. Redefining the “Substantially Limits” Language 
In order to constitute an actual disability under the first prong of the 
Act‘s definition of disability, an impairment still must substantially limit a 
major life activity.  However, the new amendments expand the meaning of 
the phrase ―substantially limits‖ in several ways. 
First, past Supreme Court decisions had defined the term as an im-
pairment that ―prevents or severely restricts an individual from performing 
major life activities.‖13  While Congress considered the ADAAA, it clearly 
sought to change this standard; however, it struggled to come up with a 
workable alternative.  An earlier version of the bill provided that the term 
―‗substantially limits‘ means ‗materially restricts.‘‖  Unfortunately, this 
new definition did little to clarify the meaning of substantial limitation.14  
Ultimately, Congress chose to punt and put the power to define the term 
―substantially limits‖ in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission‘s 





  Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). 
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  Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 504 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
11
  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, supra note 1, § 4(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)). 
12
  Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)). 
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  Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 198 (emphasis added). 
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  See Defining Disability Down: The ADA Amendment Act’s Dangerous Details, Hearing Before 
the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (July 15, 2008) (statement of Andrew 
M. Grossman, Heritage Foundation) (noting the lack of prior use of the phrase ―materially restricts‖ and 
the conflicting dictionary definitions of the terms).  See generally Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability 
Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 
83 IND. L.J. 181, 227–29 (2008) (discussing an earlier version of the ADAAA, known as the ADA Res-
toration Act). 
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expectation that the EEOC will revise that portion of its current regulations 
that defines the term ‗substantially limits‘ . . . to be consistent with this Act, 
including the Amendments made by this Act.‖15  As both the Findings and 
Purposes section and Rules of Construction section indicate that Congress 
desired a broader definition, presumably the EEOC‘s ultimate definition 
will be less restrictive than the current ―prevents or severely restricts‖ stan-
dard. 
Second, the Act also expressly rejects the ―mitigating measures‖ ap-
proach adopted by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.16  
In Sutton, the Court held that the question of whether an individual has a 
disability must be determined with reference to any mitigating or corrective 
measures the individual uses to offset the effects of a physical or mental 
impairment.17  When limited to the facts of Sutton, a case involving plain-
tiffs who were legally blind but used eyeglasses to achieve 20/20 vision, the 
mitigating measures rule did not seem particularly objectionable.  However, 
when applied to other situations, such as individuals who employed pros-
thetic devices or who take medication to control the effects of epilepsy, di-
abetes, or bipolar disorder, the rule sometimes caused bizarre results. 
In Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,18 decided the same day as Sutton, 
the Court declared that the mitigating measures rule applied not just to ar-
tificial measures, but to ―measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, 
with the body‘s own systems.‖19  Thus, an individual‘s natural or learned 
ability to compensate for the effects of an impairment was a ―mitigating 
measure‖ that must be taken into account when deciding whether the indi-
vidual had a disability.  As a result of this mitigating measures rule, numer-
ous individuals with fairly severe physical or mental impairments have been 
found not to have a disability under the ADA.20  Prior to the ADA Amend-
ments Act, several states, either through legislation or judicial decision, had 
refused to use this standard in their own disability discrimination statutes.21 
The ADA Amendments Act rejects this interpretation, specifically pro-
viding that a court must determine whether an impairment substantially lim-





  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, supra note 1, § 2(b)(6). 
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  527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
17
  See id. at 482. 
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  527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
19
  Id. at 565–66. 
20
  See, e.g., Brunke v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 344 F.3d 819, 821–22 (8th Cir. 2003) (con-
cluding that individual with epilepsy who took medication that limited the number and intensity of his 
seizures did not have a disability). 
21
  See Dahill v. Police Dep‘t of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956, 963 (Mass. 2001) (rejecting Sutton for use 
in Massachusetts‘ antidiscrimination statute); Alex Long, State Anti-Discrimination Law as a Model for 
Amending the Americans with Disabilities Act, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 597, 634–35 (2004) (discussing Cali-
fornia‘s and Rhode Island‘s statutes). 
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mitigating measures.‖22  This includes medication, artificial aids, assistive 
technology, reasonable accommodations, and ―learned behavioral or adap-
tive neurological modifications.‖23  However, the Act excepts eyeglasses 
and contact lenses from this rule.  According to the Act, ―[t]he ameliorative 
effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses‖ 
must be considered in determining whether an impairment substantially 
limits a major life activity.24  That said, the Act goes on to provide that if an 
employer uses a qualification standard based on an individual‘s uncorrected 
vision, the employer must show that the standard is job-related and consis-
tent with business necessity.25 
Finally, the Act gives new hope to potential plaintiffs whose impair-
ments are episodic in nature or in remission.  Some plaintiffs have had dif-
ficulty establishing that an impairment is substantially limiting when the 
condition is in remission or episodic because one must focus on the overall 
effects of an impairment, not just the effects when they are most severe.26  
The amendments provide that ―[a]n impairment that is episodic or in remis-
sion is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when 
active.‖27  This represents a subtle, but fairly substantial change in meaning.  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that courts should refrain 
from engaging in hypothetical inquiries as to the severity of impairments 
and instead must focus on the individual in his or her present state.28  By di-
recting courts to consider whether an impairment would substantially limit a 
major life activity if it were active, the ADA Amendments Act allows 
courts to engage in this once-prohibited type of hypothetical inquiry, at 
least in this one instance. 
C. Expanding the List of Major Life Activities 
In order to constitute an actual disability, an impairment must substan-
tially limit one or more major life activities of an individual.  The original 
version of the ADA did not contain a definition of the term ―major life ac-
tivities.‖  Instead, the task of defining this concept was left to the agencies 
charged with enforcing the various titles of the Act.  The EEOC, for exam-





  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, supra note 1, § 4(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(4)(E)(i)). 
23
  Id. 
24
  Id. 
25
  See id. § 5(b). 
26
  See, e.g., Walker v. Town of Greeneville, 347 F. Supp. 2d 566, 572–73 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (con-
cluding that individual with episodic, intermittent claustrophobia was not substantially limited in a major 
life activity). 
27
  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, supra note 1, § 4(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)). 
28
  See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002); Sutton v. United 
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). 
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major life activities.29  The relative brevity of this list led to numerous ques-
tions over the years as to whether certain activities, such as lifting, qualify 
as major life activities.  In addition, most of the activities listed in the regu-
lations—e.g., caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, and walking—
involve volitional behavior to some extent.  This led to some dispute 
whether nonvolitional bodily activities, such as eliminating waste from 
one‘s blood, amounted to a major life activity.30 
For its part, the Supreme Court defined the term ―major life activities‖ 
narrowly.  In keeping with its belief that the terms in the ADA‘s definition 
of disability should be interpreted strictly, the Court held in Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams31 that the term ―major life activi-
ties‖ referred to those activities that are of ―central importance to most 
people‘s daily lives.‖32 
The ADA Amendments Act makes several changes to the concept of 
major life activities.  First, it clarifies what has always been implicit: an im-
pairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other 
major life activities in order to be considered a disability.33  Second, it re-
jects the Supreme Court‘s ―demanding standard‖ in favor of a looser stan-
dard  According to the Findings and Purposes section, one of the purposes 
of the Act is to reject the notion that the term ―major‖ in the definition of 
major life activities needs to be interpreted strictly.34 
Instead of offering an actual definition, the Act includes a nonexhaus-
tive list of major life activities as illustration.  Aside from the fact that this 
list is now in the actual statute, rather than the accompanying regulations, 
the list is significant because it contains several new additions.  The Act 
states that: ―[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for 
oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walk-
ing, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, con-
centrating, thinking, communicating, and working.‖35 
Eating, sleeping, standing, lifting, bending, reading, concentrating, 
thinking, and communicating are all new additions to the list of major life 
activities.  The Act also clarifies that the term ―major life activities‖ in-
cludes the operation of ―major bodily function[s], including, but not limited 





  According to the regulations, ―[m]ajor [l]ife [a]ctivities means functions such as caring for one-
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.‖  
Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2008) (link). 
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  See, e.g., Fiscus v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., 385 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 2004); Kammueller v. Loo-
mis, Fargo & Co., 383 F.3d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 2004). 
31
  534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
32
  Id. at 198. 
33
  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, supra note 1, § 4(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(5)(B)). 
34
  Id. § 2(b)(4). 
35
  Id. § 4(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)). 
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bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and repro-
ductive functions.‖36  Thus, an impairment that substantially limits nonvoli-
tional bodily functions can qualify as a disability. 
D. Major Changes to the “Regarded as” Prong 
One of the most significant changes to the ADA involves the third 
prong in the ADA‘s definition of disability.  Under the original definition, 
one did not actually have to have an impairment that substantially limits a 
major life activity in order to have a disability.37  Instead, a person who was 
regarded as having such an impairment qualified as having a disability, 
even if the individual had no impairment at all.  Similarly, an individual 
who had an impairment, but one that was not substantially limiting, would 
be covered if the defendant incorrectly believed that the impairment was 
substantially limiting. 
In many ways, the ―regarded as‖ prong represents the essence of the 
ADA.  The ADA‘s definition of disability was based on a nearly identical 
definition contained in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.38  In addressing the 
―regarded as‖ prong of that act, the Supreme Court wrote in School Board 
of Nassau County v. Airline, ―Congress acknowledged that society‘s accu-
mulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as 
are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.‖39  Thus, the 
EEOC originally took the position that an individual who was rejected from 
a job because of the ―myths, fears, and stereotypes‖ associated with an im-
pairment would be covered by the ADA under the ―regarded as‖ prong.40 
Over time, however, it became clear that this was not how the ―re-
garded as‖ prong operated in practice.  Instead, courts took a more literal 
approach to the language.  The literal language of the Act provided that an 
individual was covered under the ―regarded as‖ prong only if the defendant 
regarded the individual as having ―such an impairment,‖ i.e., an impairment 
that substantially limits a major life activity.  Based on this language, courts 
concluded that it was not enough for an ADA plaintiff to show that a defen-
dant based an adverse decision on uninformed stereotypes about the plain-
tiff‘s condition.  Instead, a plaintiff had to establish that a defendant 
mistakenly believed that an impairment substantially limited a major life 
activity of the plaintiff.  As a result of Congress‘ decision to link the ―re-





  Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)). 
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  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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  29 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
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  School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). 
40
  29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(l) (2008). 
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proceeding under the ―regarded as‖ prong were frequently disqualified by 
the restrictive interpretive rules associated with the actual disability prong.41 
The ADAAA takes a new approach.  According to the Findings and 
Purposes section, one of the purposes of the Act is ―to reinstate the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Ar-
line, . . . which set forth a broad view of the third prong of the definition of 
handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.‖42  In keeping with that pur-
pose, the Act sets forth a separate definition for the ―regarded as‖ prong: 
An individual meets the requirement of ―being regarded as having such an im-
pairment‖ if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an 
action prohibited under this Act because of an actual or perceived physical or 
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to lim-
it a major life activity.43 
Thus, an ADA plaintiff no longer faces the difficult task of proving 
that a defendant‘s misperception of his or her condition was so severe as to 
amount to a belief that the condition substantially limited a major life ac-
tivity.  Instead, the new amendments place the focus on the employer‘s mo-
tivation.  If a plaintiff has a physical or mental impairment and can show 
that the impairment motivated the defendant‘s adverse action, the plaintiff 
can claim coverage under the ―regarded as‖ prong, regardless of how limit-
ing the impairment actually is.  Likewise, if the plaintiff can show that the 
defendant, rightly or wrongly, perceived the plaintiff as having an impair-
ment, and that this perception motivated the adverse action, the plaintiff is 
covered under the ―regarded as‖ prong, regardless of how limiting the de-
fendant perceives the impairment to be. 
This represents a dramatic change.  If courts give effect to the literal 
language of the definition, the meaning of the ―regarded as‖ prong has ef-
fectively been restored to something approaching the ―myths, fears, and ste-
reotypes‖ standard.  As a result, the new amendments may greatly expand 
coverage under the ―regarded as‖ prong. 
Perhaps to compensate for this expansion, the Act singles out ―transito-
ry and minor‖ impairments for special treatment under the ―regarded as‖ 
prong.  An individual who is subjected to an adverse action because of an 
actual or perceived impairment is not covered under the ―regarded as‖ 
prong if the impairment is transitory and minor.  ―A transitory impairment,‖ 
the Act explains, ―is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 
[six] months or less.‖44  The Act fails, however, to explain what qualifies as 





  See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491–93 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521–22 (1999). 
42
  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, supra note 1, § 2(b)(3). 
43
  Id. § 4(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)). 
44
  Id. (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)). 
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II. OTHER CHANGES 
In addition to the changes to the definition of disability, the ADAAA 
contains several other fairly significant changes.  These include a new pro-
vision concerning the duty of a covered entity to accommodate an individu-
al the covered entity regards as having a disability and an express statement 
concerning the authority of various federal agencies to issue regulations 
concerning the definition of disability. 
A. Accommodation of Individuals Who are Regarded as Having a 
Disability 
One of the most fundamental components of the ADA is the reasonable 
accommodation requirement.  Employers and other defendants are required 
to provide reasonable accommodations for the known physical or mental 
impairments of qualified individuals with disabilities.  Reasonable accom-
modations are a means of eliminating the unnecessary barriers that exclude 
full participation by individuals with disabilities.45  Generally speaking, rea-
sonable accommodations include modifications to the work environment or 
to the manner in which a job is customarily performed.46 
One issue that has recently divided the courts is whether an employer 
must provide a reasonable accommodation to an individual whom it merely 
regards as having a disability.  An employee with an impairment that sub-
stantially limits a major life activity (like lifting, hearing, or walking) may 
be unable to perform the essential functions of a position unless the em-
ployer somehow modifies the way the job is normally performed.  Howev-
er, if an employer merely regards an individual as having a disability, the 
individual may have no need for any type of accommodation.  In addition, 
courts have expressed concern over the possibility that such employees will 
gain a ―windfall‖ that their nondisabled coworkers are not entitled to.47  On 
the other hand, some have argued that requiring employers to provide ac-
commodations for individuals whom it believes have a disabling impair-
ment may help ―ferret[] out‖ disability discrimination.48 
The ADAAA takes the side of defendants in this instance.  The Act 
provides that employers and other covered entities ―need not provide a rea-
sonable accommodation or a reasonable modification to policies, practices, 
or procedures to an individual who meets‖ the ―regarded as‖ definition.49  
Thus, the new amendments effectively end the ongoing dispute among the 





  29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (2008). 
46
  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (2008). 
47
  Webber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999). 
48
  Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
49
  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, supra note 1, § 6(a)(1). 
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B. Power to the Agencies 
One concern about the ADA has been the authority that the various 
agencies charged with enforcing the Act have with respect to defining the 
terms within the definition of disability.  The EEOC, Attorney General, and 
Secretary of Transportation are all charged with the enforcement of differ-
ent titles of the ADA.  However, the definition of disability does not appear 
in any of those titles.  Instead, the definition appears in the general provi-
sions of the Act.50  This fact led the Supreme Court in Sutton to question 
what degree of deference the EEOC‘s interpretations of the definition of 
disability were due.51  This lack of express authority may also help explain 
why the Court refused to defer to the EEOC‘s interpretation of the defini-
tion of disability in Sutton.52  The ADA Amendments Act resolves the ques-
tion by specifically providing that ―the authority to issue regulations 
granted to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Attorney 
General, and the Secretary of Transportation under the Act includes the au-
thority to issue regulations implementing the definition of disability.‖53 
III. UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
Despite the numerous changes to the language of the ADA, the ADA 
Amendments Act fails to address a number of controversial and potentially 
contentious issues. 
A. The Single-Job Rule 
The Act does not address one of the more limiting interpretations of 
the definition of disability: the so-called ―single-job rule.‖  Under this rule, 
in order to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, it is 
not enough that an individual‘s impairment preclude him or her from a sin-
gle job or narrow category of jobs.  Instead, the individual must be prec-
luded from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs.54  As a result of this rule, 
ADA plaintiffs have had great difficulty establishing that they were actually 
disabled when working was the major life activity in question.55  The new 





  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). 
51
  Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479–80 (1999). 
52
  See id. 481–84 (refusing to defer to the EEOC‘s view on the question of whether mitigating 
measures should be considered in determining whether an individual has a disability). 
53
  ADA Amendments Act of 2008, supra note 1, § 6(a)(2). 
54
  Sutton, 527 U.S. at 91–92. 
55
  See, e.g., id. at 493 (concluding that plaintiffs were not substantially limited in the major life ac-
tivity of working because there visual impairment only precluded them from holding the single job of 
global airline pilot). 
56
  It is conceivable, however, that the EEOC will revisit the issue when it revises the definition of 
disability as instructed by Congress.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text.  It is also worth noting 
that in Sutton the Supreme Court raised some concerns about whether ―working‖ qualifies as a major life 
activity, despite the EEOC‘s inclusion of working in its list of major life activities.  Sutton, 527 U.S. at 
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the coverage of the ―regarded as‖ prong, the single-job rule is unlikely to 
have quite the same preclusive effect it has had in the past.57 
B. Short-Term Impairments 
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing of Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the Su-
preme Court held that in order to constitute a disability, the impact of an 
impairment must be permanent or long-term.58  To some extent, this holding 
conflicts with the position taken by the EEOC.  Under the EEOC‘s ap-
proach, the permanent or long-term impact of an impairment was simply 
one factor to consider in making the disability determination.  Other factors 
included the nature and severity of the impairment and the duration or ex-
pected duration of the impairment.59  As mentioned, under the ADAAA, the 
―regarded as‖ prong does not cover actual or perceived impairments that are 
transitory in nature.60  However, the amendments do not explain how transi-
tory impairments should be assessed under the actual disability definition. 
C. The Forgotten “Record of” Prong 
The vast majority of ADA plaintiffs proceed under the actual or ―re-
garded as‖ prongs of the definition of disability.  There is a third option, 
however.  The ―record of‖ prong was designed to cover individuals who 
had recovered, in whole or in part, from a once substantially-limiting im-
pairment or who had been misclassified as having a disability.61  Despite the 
extensive revisions to the actual disability and ―regarded as‖ prongs in the 
ADA‘s three-pronged definition of disability, the ADA Amendments Act 
does not address the ―record of‖ prong.  For a variety of reasons, plaintiffs 
do not often rely on this part of the definition of disability.  When they do, 
however, they are sometimes confronted with interpretive rules that limit 
the scope of this part of the definition.  For example, some courts have con-
cluded that that an employer must rely on an actual tangible ―record‖ indi-
cating the existence of disability in order for a plaintiff to be covered under 
the ―record of‖ prong.62  The new amendments do nothing to breathe new 
life into the forgotten ―record of‖ prong, nor do they provide any clarifica-
tion as to any of the interpretive issues surrounding this portion of the defi-
nition of disability. 
                                                                                                                           
492.  The ADAAA resolves any uncertainty on this point by including ―working‖ in its list of major life 
activities.  ADA Amendments Act § 4(a). 
57
  See supra notes 37–44 and accompanying text (discussing changes to the ―regarded as‖ prong). 
58
  Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). 
59
  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2008). 
60
  See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
61
  Alex B. Long, (Whatever Happened To) The ADA’s “Record of” Prong(?), 81 WASH. L. REV. 
669, 681 (2006). 
62
  Id. at 689–90 
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D. Interacting with Others as a Major Life Activity 
Courts have split on the questions of whether interacting with others 
qualifies as a major life activity and what it takes for one to be substantially 
limited in this activity.63  These issues have proven particularly problematic 
for the courts.  Despite its inclusion of several new major life activities, the 
ADA Amendments Act is silent on whether interacting with others qualifies 
as a major life activity.  Arguably, its inclusion of ―communicating‖ might 
conceivably cover ―interacting with others,‖ but there is no express resolu-
tion of this question. 
E. Limited Guidance on Reasonable Accommodations 
With the exception of the amendment concerning the accommodation 
of ―regarded as‖ plaintiffs and interpretative power of the EEOC, nearly all 
of the focus of the ADAAA is on the definition of disability.  In order to be 
protected by the ADA, one must be a qualified individual with a disability.  
In the employment context, this means an individual with a disability who, 
with or without reasonable accommodation, is capable of performing the 
essential functions of the position the individual holds or desires.  By 
amending the ADA‘s definition of disability, Congress has assured that 
more individuals will qualify as having disabilities.  As a result, more cases 
in the future will turn on the question of whether the plaintiff‘s requested 
accommodation was reasonable. 
Unfortunately, Congress has done little to assist courts in devising a 
clearer standard regarding what qualifies as a ―reasonable‖ accommodation.  
The original version of the ADA did little to define the concept, leaving it 
to the courts to flesh out its contours.  Unfortunately, the few times the Su-
preme Court has addressed the concept of reasonable accommodation or 
reasonable modification, the cases have been so fact specific as to provide 
little guidance for future cases.64 
One of the more persuasive explanations as to why the federal courts 
initially made it so difficult for ADA plaintiffs to qualify as having a disa-
bility is that the courts sought to avoid having to deal with complex and 
messy reasonable accommodation issues.  By adopting a strict definition of 
disability, courts were able to avoid dealing with accommodation issues 
that, due to their fact-specific nature, were not easily decided on a motion 





  Compare Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding that interact-
ing with others is a major life activity) with Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 
1997) (expressing great doubt as to whether getting along with others is a major life activity). 
64
  See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002); PGA Tour, Inc. v Martin, 532 U.S. 661 
(2001). 
103:217  (2008) Introducing the New and Improved ADA 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/44/ 229 
dens on employers.65  Regardless of the reason, the end result has been a 
marked lack of clear rules on the subject of reasonable accommodation.   
The new amendments do virtually nothing to assist courts and potential 
litigants in this regard.  The amendments leave a host of reasonable ac-
commodation issues unresolved, such as whether an employer must, as part 
of its duty of reasonable accommodation, reassign an individual with a dis-
ability to a vacant position when there is another, more qualified applicant66 
and whether there should be a presumption that allowing an employee to 
work from home is not a reasonable accommodation.67  Instead of taking the 
opportunity to resolve the conflicting standards on these points, by relaxing 
the standard for qualifying as having a disability, Congress may have ac-
tually made the job of courts tougher. 
CONCLUSION 
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 represents a fairly dramatic 
change in disability law.  Despite the skepticism of some (myself included) 
that Congress would enact any meaningful changes to the ADA in the near 
term, Congress has produced legislation that addresses some of the more 
pressing and controversial issues associated with the ADA.  Although there 
are still numerous issues that remain unresolved, many of the changes that 
Congress did make were long overdue and are likely to provide greater cov-
erage at the initial stage of determining whether an individual has a disabili-
ty than existed previously under the Act.  Whether these amendments will 
produce dramatic changes in terms of the overall effectiveness of the ADA, 





  See Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment 
Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 336–37 
(2001) (discussing this theory). 
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  See, e.g., EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Mid-
land Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999). 
67
  See, e.g., Van Zande v. State of Wis. Dep‘t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995) (―[I]t 
would take a very extraordinary case for the employee to be able to create a triable issue of the employ-
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